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Define new tactics in order to reach a target that is now ...more
widely spread in the social body. Find new techniques for adjusting punishment ...and for adapting its effects. Lay down new
principles for regularizing, refining, universalizing the art of
punishing. Homogenize its application. Reduce its economic and
political cost by increasing its effectiveness and by multiplying
its circuits. In short, constitute a new economy and a new technology of the power to punish.
-Michel

Foucault, Discipline and Punish'

The High-level Signing Conference for the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime concluded today its
four-day session in Palermo, Italy....

•.. The Convention extends well beyond the sphere of cooperation on drug trafficking.... An important goal of the instrument
is to get all countries to synchronize their national laws, so that
there can be no uncertainty as to whether a crime in one country
is also a crime in another.
-United

Nations Press Release, December 15, 2000.2

This Article is the first in a series of studies of the globalization of illicit markets. My theses are as follows: First, the increase in international
trade in illicit products and services parallels the growth in international
trade more generally that accompanies the phenomenon of globalization.3 Second, at the same time that most international trade law has
moved toward a posture of liberalization, there has been a movement to
strengthen the prohibition and punishment of trade in illicit transactions.
Third, the mechanisms that have developed to regulate this prohibition
constitute a significant development in the international legal order.'
This Article seeks to establish a conceptual framework for analyzing
the international law of illegal trade-one might say "prohibitive
I.
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 89 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage
Books 1979) (1977).
2.
Press Release, United Nations, More Than 120 Nations Sign New UN Convention
on Transnational Organized Crime as High-Level Meeting Concludes in Palermo, U.N. Doc.
L/T/4359 (Dec. 15, 2000).
3.
See infra Part I for a discussion of globalization in licit international trade and in
international narcotics trafficking.
4.
See infra Part II for an analytical framework of international trade, and Part III for a
description of the cross-movements within licit and illicit international trade.
5.
See infra Parts V and VI.
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international law"-by focusing on the case of narcotics.6 The history of
prohibitive regimes in international law is under-studied. This framework
moves beyond the criminological lens, which focuses on the question of
whether criminalization is or is not the correct response to narcotics
trade. 7 Rather, it situates the narcotics regime within the broader frame of
international legal development.
6.
Cf Kal Raustiala, Law, Liberalization & International Narcotics Trafficking, 32
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 89, 91 (1999) (noting that the relationship between liberalization of
legal and illegal trade "has been the subject of surprisingly little legal and political attention").
Raustiala's paper, documenting the empirical links between liberalization of legal and illegal
trade that are also discussed in Part I of this Article, constitutes perhaps the only other treatment of the issue in the legal academy that does not employ an exclusively criminal law
approach.
7.
Weighing the costs and benefits of prohibition is complex. For example, there are at
least three types of costs of prohibition. First, enforcement costs are very high, particularly for
the United States. A formidable array of federal agencies combat narcotics, including the
Department of State (Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL),
Bureau of International Organizations coordinating with United Nations agencies, and regional Bureaus), the Department of Defense, the Agency for International Development, the
U.S. Coast Guard, and the Central Intelligence Agency.
Second, prohibition appears to breed violence and instability. Users commit theft crimes
in order to pay the increased price of illegal drugs; dealers and suppliers commit crimes to
control the lucrative trade. Traffickers seek to corrupt government agencies so as to prevent
prosecution of narcotics crimes. Recently, a connection between illegal drugs and terrorism
has also arisen. See The Western Hemisphere's Response to the September 11, 2001 Terrorist
Attack in the United States: Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on International Relations, 107th Cong. 2 (2001) (statement of Rep.
Ballenger) (stating that "drug trafficking and terrorism ... share a symbiotic relationshipfeeding off one another-one making the other possible" and discussing links between Columbian drug syndicates and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) and
National Liberation Army (ELN), as well as links between opium production and the Taliban
in Afghanistan).
Third, there may be ideological costs associated with producing justifications that would
prop up a regime that is so costly and generative of violence. In a liberal State, the exercise of
government power must be justified in a way that reconciles authority with freedom. See
Pierre Schlag, The Empty Circles Of Liberal Justification, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1997). A prime
justification for such authority is that it serves the public interest and is exercised with a
certain level of expertise. See Chantal Thomas, Constitutional Change and International
Government, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2001). Joseph Raz argues that authority serves to mediate
"between people and the right reasons which apply to them, so that the authority judges and
pronounces what they ought to do according to right reasons." Joseph Raz, Authority, Law and
Morality, 68 THE MONIST 295, 299 (1985). This justification, which Raz argues is implicit
and pervasive, allows for what he terms the "practical authority" of law-a presumption that
the law is justified on the basis of correct reasons, without a need to verify that it is. Raz's
conception of authority, however, is admittedly "ideal." JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF
FREEDOM (1986). In contrast to this ideal, a State may make laws for incorrect reasons,
yielding a number of troubling implications. In the case of narcotics, if the reasons supporting
criminalization are wrong, then substantial governmental resources are wasted. The
implications extend beyond material waste of public resources, however. If the State's
reasoning is fla~ved, then the presumption of its correctness will encourage wrong views
amongst its constituencies. In the instant case, citizens would believe, incorrectly, that
criminalization of narcotics is effective. To support this incorrect view, citizens might conflate
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the violence that arises when narcotics use is criminalized with the use of narcotics itself. This
conflation appears to be very real: the predominant view amongst the public appears to be that
the use of narcotics inherently breeds violence. See, e.g., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE
571 (Joshua Dressier et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) (contribution by Douglas Husak) ("Public
anxiety about drug use is fueled by the perception that people under the influence of drugs
often behave violently and irrationally.") However, substantial research supports the opposite
view: that most narcotics-related violence results from the criminalization of narcotics rather
than from the use of narcotics themselves. See DRUGS-VIOLENCE TASK FORCE, PRELIMINARY
FINAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 40 (1996); see also
UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE (Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth eds.,
1993). Finally, the ideological danger here is not just that the State can generate incorrect
beliefs-for example, the belief that narcotics use inherently breeds violence-but also that it
can reflect and reinforce incorrect beliefs. Elsewhere, I have discussed how "illegimate
ideologies" may serve to justify approaches to global poverty that attribute such poverty to
defects inherent in the poor rather than to systemic causes or to the actions of the rich. See
Chantal Thomas, Causes of Inequality in the International Economic Order: Critical Race
Theory and Postcolonial Development, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. I (1999). For
an application to the current case, see Symposium, Legalization of Drugs, 1991 U.C. DAvIs L.
REV. 555.
Juxtaposed against these costs are what appear to be only limited benefits of prohibitionism. First, most social scientists have concluded that there is only a low deterrent effect of
criminalizing drug use, production or trade. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 479-84 (3d ed. 2000). (For a dissenting perspective see James Q. Wilson, Against
the Legalization of Drugs, COMMENT., Feb. 1990, at 21.) Second, criminalization is also
unlikely to reduce supply. In 1999, the "farmgate" price per kilogram of coca base in Bolivia
was estimated by the U.N. Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention to be US$900. In
1999, prices for Bolivia's major legal cash crops were US$19 per kilogram of coffee-about 2
percent of the going price for the equivalent amount of coca base-and about US$2, per kilo
of soybeans, or about 0.2 percent of the coca base price. See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF U.N.,
U.N. REPORT ON GLOBAL ILLICIT DRUG TRENDS, at 46, U.N. Sales No.E.00.XI.10 (2000);
FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF U.N., THE STATE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 2001, at 11-13 (FAO
Agriculture Series No. 33, 2002). The criminalization of international trafficking, on the one
hand, and the liberalization of the international market on the other, ensure that international
narcotics trade will continue. Criminalization dramatically increases the potential profits of
narcotics trade. For countries with few other competitive advantages, the lure may well outweigh the danger.
Thus, a prohibitionist approach to the international narcotics trade exacts a whole host of
costs. However, it is difficult to determine whether those costs are less than those that would
result under a more lenient regulatory model. Decriminalizing the narcotics trade would almost certainly reduce the price of narcotics, because many more suppliers would be willing to
enter into licit production, and transaction costs would be much lower. A likely result of
reducing the restrictions on narcotics, would be increased recreational use of narcotics, both
due to the lower price and due to increased consumer amenability to usage of licit as opposed
to illicit goods. This might generate the kind of public health costs associated with current
legal drugs: health effects from long-term use, increased risk of accidents resulting from
impairment, like car crashes, etc. (Another result of decriminalization would be the lowering
of "farmgate" prices for developing country producers. Although it might be viewed as a perverse effect the current system does redistribute wealth away from rich consumers to poor
farmers even if most of that wealth is absorbed by traffickers in the middle). On the other
hand, decreased revenue under a decriminalized regime might well be offset by net benefits
resulting from greater stability and less violence and corruption in supplier countries.)
Because the distributional consequences of various regulatory modes are so complex,
weighing them falls beyond the scope of this Article. This Article does not endorse a particular
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I. THE GLOBALIZATION OF NARCOTICS

While the omni-term "globalization" can mean many (probably too
many) different things, from a purely material standpoint the term refers
to the dramatic increase in contemporary times of international production and consumption!
After World War II, world trade in goods 9 "grew at a rate twice as
fast as the overall world economy."'" For the United States, "trade volume multiplied nearly twenty-fold" during the same time frame." In the
globalized economy, intricate chains of manufacture, assembly, distribution, and retail link together an ever greater number of countries. Lan
Cao's description of modern automobile production is classic:
A Chevy may be built in Mexico from imported parts and then
re-imported into the United States; a Ford built in German plants
by Turkish workers and sold in Hong Kong and Nigeria; a
Toyota Camry designed by an American designer at Toyota's
Newport Beach California Calty Design Research Center,
assembled at the Georgetown, Kentucky plant from Americanmade parts (except that the engine and drive trains are still
Japanese) and then test driven at Toyota's Arizona proving
ground. 2
Car production seems a typical facet of the global production. Illegal
drug production, however, exceeds car production as a proportion of the
global economy.' 3 The United Nations Office for Drug Control and
regulatory model. Rather, it highlights the substantive and institutional dynamics of the current
model and the significance of those dynamics for the international legal order.
8.
See Chantal Thomas, Globalization and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 33 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1451, 1476 (2000). In fact, globalization has a more specific vector: it has to do
with increasing penetration of industrializedsocieties by the international market. Developing
States, as a result of colonialism, have arguably been in the throes of "globalization" since
their inception.
9.
The international economy consists not only of trade in goods, but also of trade in
services and of international capital flows. These latter sectors have increased dramatically as
well. See id. at 1476-78.

10.

Id. at 1477 (citing 1999

TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND

1998

ANNUAL REPORT OF

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 19).
11.
1999 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 1998 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 19.

12.
Thomas, supra note 8, at 1479 (quoting Lan Cao, Money, Power, and Culture in the
Global Economy: Towards a New Sensibility for International Economic Development 15-27
(1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)).
13.
"Illegal drugs are one of the world's largest traded sectors, with the global market
estimated at $400-$500 billion a year-nearly 10% of total world trade and larger than the
global automobile market." Raustiala, supra note 6, at 90. In the 1980s alone, for example,
global illicit coca leaf production tripled, and global illicit opium production increased eightfold. U.N. OFFICE FOR DRUG CONTROL AND CRIME PREVENTION (UNODCCP), WORLD DRUG
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Crime Prevention (UNODCCP) reports that the last two decades have
witnessed "the global spread of drug trafficking," rendering it "now truly
a global phenomenon." 4 The complexity of narcotics trade rivals that of
multinational corporations.' 5 The United States Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law has observed that "[t~he relatively simple charts of
drug flows" of previous eras "now resemble schematic drawings of intriin the world to the ...drug
cate ...networks tying nearly every country
6
countries."'
trafficking
and
production
In addition to sharing the same characteristics,the globalization of
licit goods and illicit narcotics share many of the same causes. Advances
in communications technology constitute one such cause;' 7 for example,
the telecommunications network that facilitates international capital
investment also facilitates money laundering for the illicit narcotics
2000, at 24, U.N. Sales No. G.V.E.00.0.10 (2000) [hereinafter WORLD DRUG REPORT
2000] (showing an increase between 1980 and 1990 in coca leaf production from
approximately 100,000 to 325,000 tons, and in opium production from approximately 500 to
4,000 tons). In the latter half of the 1990s, global production of opium remained stable, until a
sharp increase in 1999 production in Afghanistan brought the 1999 total to 6,500 tons. See id.
Coca leaf production, however, has declined in the late 1990s to approximately 300,000 tons.
See id.
WORLD DRUG REPORT 2000, supra note 13, at 32-33. The report states:
14.
REPORT

In 1980-81, one hundred and twenty countries and territories reported drug seizures. By 1987-88, this number had increased to 144. Over the next decade, it
again increased substantially, to 170 in 1997-98. Though the total number of countries in the world also increased during the period, this is still unequivocal evidence
of the fact that drug trafficking is now a truly global phenomenon.
Id.
15.
Cocaine generally originates in the Andean countries-Colombia, Bolivia, and
Peru. Id. at 33. From these countries, cocaine travels "via Central America to Mexico and the
USA; via the Pacific coast to North America, via Venezuela and/or the Caribbean to Europe;
from Peru and Bolivia to Brazil and via western or southern Africa to Europe." Id. at 35.
Opiates, on the other hand, generally originate either in Asia, particularly Afghanistan
and Myanmar, or in Latin America, particularly Colombia. Id. at 32-33. From Afghanistan,
they travel "via Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and the Balkan route (and its various branches) to countries of the European Union and the European Free Trade Association." Id. at 33. From
Myanmar, opiates travel "via China (including Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan, Province of
China) to North America (complementing and partly replacing the traditional route via Thailand and Hong Kong SAR)." Id. at 35. From Colombia, opiates proceed "along new trafficking
routes-often parallel to those already in existence for cocaine-to the USA." Id. Finally,
"[v]arious African countries are increasingly linked into trafficking routes for transshipment
purposes." Id.

16.
CONTROL

BUREAU FOR INT'L NARCOTICS AND LAW,
STRATEGY

REPORT

(1998) [hereinafter

U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE, tNT'L NARCOTICS

INT'L NARCOTICS

CONTROL

STRATEGY

For example, "Colombian syndicates have established cocaine distribution centers on
every continent ....They share the lucrative drug trade with Russian, Turkish, Italian,
Nigerian, Chinese, Lebanese and Pakistani heroin trafficking syndicates" Id.
17.
See Thomas, supra note 8, at 1480 (describing how, for licit goods,
"[clommunications and information technology advances have made it easier to move money
and know-how internationally and to coordinate production internationally").
REPORT].
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trade. In addition, modern transportation (such as air, rail, road, and even
national mail and commercial courier services) facilitates the production
and distribution of narcotics.' 8 Further, because narcotics are so
frequently smuggled in otherwise legal distribution chains, often it is not
only the same types of technology, but the same actual shipment, that
drives trade in both licit goods and illicit narcotics.'9
There is one final connection between the globalization of licit and
illicit trade, found in international trade law itself. The primary multilateral trade agreements name the expansion of world trade as their central
objective. ° Most believe that these agreements have largely achieved
their objective: John Jackson, for example, has asserted that "t]o a great
extent, contemporary international economic interdependence can be
attributed to the success" of the multilateral trade regime in expanding
global trade.2 ' The expansion in communications, transportation, and
trade volume also facilitates trafficking, so that the institutionalized expansion of legal trade has generated "spillover effects" expanding illegal
trade. 22

18.
WORLD DRUG REPORT 2000, supra note 13, at 35. As Kal Raustiala has observed,
"international economic liberalization eases the transboundary movement of illicit drugs by
lowering transport prices, improving transportation infrastructure, and enhancing distribution
networks." Raustiala, supra note 6, at 117.
19.
Kal Raustiala has vividly described this phenomenon:
Higher trade volume results in more places to hide drugs and, ceteris paribus, a
lower probability of interdiction and seizure. Coupled with law enforcement clampdowns on alternate smuggling techniques, such increases in sheer trade volume and
the number of hiding spots make commercial shipping increasingly attractive to
drug traffickers. The greater use of containers in international trade adds to this dynamic. At the U.S.-Mexico border, for example, illegal drugs have been discovered
hidden in highway trucks in every imaginable way, including in the hollowed-out
cores of vegetables.
Raustiala, supra note 6, at 119.
20.
See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,

1994, pmbl. [hereinafter WTO Agreement], LEGAL INSTRUMENTS -RESULTS OF THE URUVol. I, 33 I.L.M. 81, 84 (1994) (observing the importance of "expanding the

GUAY ROUND

production of and trade in goods and services"); General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct.
30, 1947, pmbl., 61 Stat. A- 1l,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (avowing a commitment to "developing the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the
production and exchange of goods").

21.

LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMic RELATIONS

(John H. Jackson et

al. eds., 3d ed 1995); see also Thomas, supra note 8, at 1480 ("International trade agreements
have probably been the most important instruments the federal government has used to catalyze globalization").
22.
Raustiala, supra note 6, at 116 ("International law has been a crucial part of [the]
liberalization project: ...The clash with international drug control comes from the fact that
separating legal goods from illegal goods, at an acceptable administrative cost, is extremely
difficult.").
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Yet, while the globalization of legal trade has preoccupied many in

international legal literature, the globalization of illegal trade has been
largely neglected. This Article seeks to situate the latter issue within
international legal analysis, as an overlooked aspect of the international
trade regime. The next Part describes a framework for this end.
II. AN

INTERNATIONAL TRADE ANALYSIS: THE SUBSTANTIVE
AND INSTITUTIONAL AXES

This Article will employ the framework for analyzing international
economic law that I have developed elsewhere.23 This framework operates along two axes: the substantive and the institutional.
The substantive axis, described broadly, considers how loose or how
strict are the legal controls placed on trade flows. On one side of the
spectrum, governments adopt rules that minimize trade restrictions and
therefore maximize trade flows. A government that has adopted a very
liberal trade regime will impose few trade restrictions on imported
goods,24 whereas a government with a more restrictive trade regime will
adopt rules that maximize trade restrictions and minimize trade flows. 5
In the middle of this spectrum, a government operates in what might be
called an "administrative" mode.26 A government in the administrative
mode will balance trade policy alongside other concerns, such as protecting domestic industry, or pursuing environmental or health objectives.
The term "balance" here is not intended to portray the administrative
mode as either more valid or less valid than the other regulatory models.
Rather, it simply indicates that, in the administrative mode, trade policy

will not necessarily preempt other objectives.

23.
See, e.g., Chantal Thomas, Balance-of-Payments Crises in the Developing World:
Balancing Trade, Finance and Development in the New Economic Order, 15 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 1249 (2000).
24.
Examples of low trade restrictions are very low tariffs or no tariffs at all on imported goods, elimination of quotas on imported goods, elimination of policies that
discriminate in favor of certain producers over others, streamlining social regulations to offer
the least possible resistance to trade flows, and so on.
25.
A government that has adopted a very prohibitive trade regime will impose very
high tariffs on imported goods, establish strict quotas on imported goods, maintain policies
that discriminate against foreign producers in favor of domestic producers, and even in favor
of some foreign producers (based on the government's political alliances) over others, maintain social regulations that are complex and difficult to negotiate for foreign producers, and so
on.
26.
This term is somewhat misleading in that the liberal and prohibitive models of trade
regulation also, of course, require administration. The term is intended, however, to evoke a
sense that the government does not hold either the maximization or the minimization of trade
flows as a primary objective.
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While the substantive axis constitutes an important element of any
analysis of international trade, such analysis is not complete without addressing institutional considerations. The institutional axis assesses an
issue that domestic law scholars take for granted, but perennially occupies international law scholarship: enforceability. 7 Institutional analysis
in international law studies how best to secure efficacy and order.
The opposite poles of the institutional analytical axis might be
described as "pragmatism" versus "legalism."2 These two poles
represent radically different styles of international governance. The
pragmatic approach seeks to inculcate a general spirit of compliance
amongst its members, rather than seeking to constrain sovereigns
through strict enforcement of rules. This is done by emphasizing, at
every given opportunity, the importance of the central principles of the
system without converting those principles into actionable claims. 2" A
legalistic institutional approach rejects pragmatism as insufficient to
build a coherent and stable international order. Legalism holds central
the attainment of an international rule of law that approximates domestic
legal systems. A legalistic approach will, therefore, favor relatively
bright-line interpretations of rules over flexible interpretations. It will
seek to develop and expand formal constraints on State behavior.
Both the substantive and institutional axes are critical to a full understanding of the dynamics within international trade law. The next Part
will consider both the licit international trade regime and the international regime governing illicit narcotics transactions through this
framework. To begin with, it will demonstrate that while these regimes
27.
A classic query in international law puts it bluntly: "Is international law really
law?" See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 209 (1961) ("The question 'Is international law really law' can hardly be put aside."); Peter J. Spiro, Globalization, International
Law, and the Academy, 32 N.YU.J. INT'L L. & POL. 567, 576 n.16 (2000) (quoting HART,
supra, at 209); see also Anthony D'Amato, Is InternationalLaw Really "Law"?, 79 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1293 (1985); Richard S. Kay, The European Human Rights System as a System of Law, 6
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 55, 55 (2000) (noting the "venerable and unresolved question: Is international law really 'law'?" and citing D'Amato, supra); Anne Orford, Positivism and the Power
of International Law, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 502, 521 (2000) (" 'Is international law really
law?', a question that haunts international legal theory, is a manifestation of the sense that
international law lacks.., sovereign force.") (citing D'Amato, supra). In accordance with this
classic query, a classic paranoia of international law is that there is no "real" rule of law at the
international level, but only a system of "might makes right" among sovereign States. For an
influential exposition of this thesis, see HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS:
THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (5th ed. 1973).
28.
A pragmatic institutional strategy for effectiveness recognizes that the State Parties
to any international agreement are sovereign, and as such have the inherent ability to withdraw
from or otherwise undermine the international system at any time. This description benefits
from John Jackson's discussion of "power-oriented" versus "rule-oriented" systems.
29.
This approach has prevailed at different times in a variety of regimes, including the
human rights and trade regimes.
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can be placed along the same substantive spectrum, they have progressed
in opposite directions along that spectrum. It will then discuss the concepts that mediate this apparent contradiction.
III. THE SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS
A. The GAIT/WTO Regime: Protectionism to Liberalization
In the twentieth century, the licit international trade regime progressed from a relatively antagonistic approach to imports to an ever
more liberal one. In the period after World War I and before World War
II, the governments of Europe and the United States engaged in unabashed protectionism. The United States, for example, adopted tariff
levels under its Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 that resulted in the
highest average tariff imposed on dutiable goods in U.S. history.3" Following World War II, most economists and statesmen concluded that the
ills of the interwar period-both the economic decline and the political
hostilities-had been exacerbated by the protectionist policies of the
world's major powers.' Consequently, the leading governments after
World War II sought to construct a trade regime that would prevent a
return to such widespread protectionism. The resulting General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter GATT) established basic
principles of non-discrimination and a mechanism through which governments could negotiate the gradual reduction of trade barriers.
While the GATT system embraced the liberal economic theory that
the reduction of trade barriers increases domestic and global social
welfare, the particulars of the system allowed for considerable departure
from this theory. Members could adopt trade barriers intended as
temporary protection ("safeguards") against a sudden and unexpected
import surge that could harm domestic industry.32 A member could also
impose trade barriers on imports that were "unfairly traded" (for
30.

The old chestnut that Smoot-Hawley established the "highest tariff schedule in

American history" is mistaken, according to Alfred Eckes.

ALFRED

E. ECKES,

JR., OPENING

U.S. FOREIGN TRADE POLICY SINCE 1776 (1995). Eckes observes that
the "average duty on all imports-free and dutiable" established by Smoot-Hawley (13.7
percent) was lower than it had been for almost a century prior to World War 1. Id. at 106.
Eckes points out that Smoot-Hawley's notorious 59.1 percent average tariff is based on the
"average ad valorem equivalent rate on dutiable imports in 1932." Id. But "Congress did not
enact such a high average tariff in 1930. Price declines during the depression produced that
result, [since] [Ihike predecessor tariffs, Smoot-Hawley relied on a combination of specific and
ad valorem rates." Id.
31.
As governments engaged in rounds of escalating protectionism, imports and exports
sharply decreased worldwide. LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS,
supra note 21, at 5.
GA'T art. XIX.
32.
AMERICA'S MARKET:
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and where
example, "antidumping duties" against "dumped" imports)
33
there is injury or a threat of injury to domestic industry.
Although the international trade regime embraced liberal principles,
it tolerated a significant level of deviation from these principles by governments who were pursuing competing objectives of domestic
economic protection or social regulation. The aggregate effect of
GATT's provisions placed it somewhere between the liberal end of the
spectrum-articulated in its principles-and a more middle-ground
"administrative" approach that balanced the principles of liberalization
with other concerns expressed in the GATT's numerous exceptions.
This structure, though, provided an internal logic that would propel
the regime ever closer to the liberal approach. Subsequent trade negotiations focused not only on lowering tariffs, but also on narrowing these
exceptions. The institution that succeeded the GATT-the World Trade
Organization (WTO)-restricts the conditions under which safeguards,
antidumping duties, and other trade restrictions can be imposed.34 While
the shift to a liberal approach is far from complete-the GATT/WTO
system still constitutes an intricate interplay between rule and exception-it is nonetheless significant. Under the WTO, tariff levels are at an
historic low.
B. The InternationalNarcoticsRegime:
Liberalizationto Prohibition
At the same time that the international regime for governing trade in
licit goods was slowly shifting from a protectionist to a liberal approach,
the international narcotics regime was effecting a shift in the opposite
direction.
For most of the nineteenth century, the British championed the expansion of international trade in narcotics. Indeed, through its production
stronghold in India, the narcotics trade provided a significant source of
revenue for the British Empire. So dear was the opium market that Britain went to war with China over the latter's refusal to admit British
imports of opium.35 Of course, the preference for liberalization was not
total-the British trade in opium traveled through monopolies-but the
British unquestionably favored the minimization of import restrictions
33.
GATT art. VI. A member could adopt trade restrictive "social regulations"-for
example, environmental conservation measures-provided such measures were not unduly
arbitrary or discriminatory against foreign producers. GATT art. XX.
34.
See, e.g., Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Agreement on Safeguards, Agreement oil Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1153 (1994).
35.
See generally PETER W. FAY, OPIUM WAR (1975).
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on narcotics at this time. At the turn of the twentieth century, both opium
and cocaine were widely used by consumers in the developed world in a
variety of over-the-counter food and medicine products.
Between the conclusion of the Opium War and the first modem multilateral agreement regulating trade in narcotics-the Hague Convention
of 1912-the prevalent attitude in the West toward narcotics shifted considerably. The Hague Convention of 1912 obliged signatories to "confine
to medical and legitimate purposes the manufacture, sale and use of'
opium, heroin, morphine, and cocaine. 36 The next several agreements
built on this model of medical control. The Geneva Convention of 1925
required Member States to furnish statistics supporting their estimates of
"medical and legitimate" narcotics imports and exports. 7 The Geneva
Convention of 1931 required Member States to extend their export control schemes to all States, not just other members.38 Finally, the 1948
Paris Protocol required Member States to report information about any
"medical and scientific" drugs not listed in the 1931 Convention that
could have harmful effects or could be subject to abuse. The Protocol
also provided for the application of the 1931 Convention's controls to
any drug deemed harmful by the World Health Organization.39
Thus, the agreements in the first half of the twentieth century gradually strengthened the medical controls narcotics trade. In doing so, the
agreements evinced an "administrative" approach-neither liberal, nor
prohibitive-that sought to circumscribe, but not to prevent, narcotics
production and trade. These early agreements sought neither to expand
nor to eliminate narcotics production and trade, but rather to control it in
accordance with "medical and scientific" concerns.
The second half of the twentieth century saw the U.N. narcotics regime shift from an administrative model toward an increasingly
prohibitionist one. The 1961 United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs ° marked the beginning of tlhis shift. On the one hand, the
1961 Convention retained the administrative focus, though it tightened
controls on members' ability to produce and trade narcotics for medical

36.

International Opium Convention, Jan. 23, 1912, 8 L.N.T.S. 187.

37.

Agreement Concerning the Suppression of the Manufacture of, Internal Trade in,

and Use of, Prepared Opium, Feb. 11, 1925, 51 L.N.T.S. 337.
38.
Agreement Concerning the Suppression of Opium Smoking, Nov. 27, 1931, 177
L.N.T.S. 373.
39.
Protocol Bringing Under International Control Drugs Outside of the Scope of the
1931 Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic
Drugs, Nov. 19, 1948, 44 U.N.T.S. 277.
40.
The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1408, 520
U.N.T.S. 204 [hereinafter 1961 Convention].
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purposes.4 On the other, it sowed the seeds of a punitive approach by
requiring Member States to establish as criminal offenses the production
or trade of narcotics.42 The 1961 Convention also required States to es43
tablish conspiracy as a crime.
The 1961 Convention's intermingling of the medical-administrative
and punitive approaches is perhaps best found in an important exception
to the criminalization provisions: where unauthorized narcotics production or trade occurred at the hands of "abusers of drugs," a signatory
could adopt measures of "treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation
and social reintegration" as an alternative response.4
The medical, rehabilitative tone of the 1961 Convention shifted to a
more punitive register in the 1988 Convention on Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances.4 ' The 1961 Convention's "drug abuser" exception narrowed in 1988 to production only "for personal consumption," or
otherwise to "cases of a minor nature. 46 Moreover, the 1988 Convention
multiplied the number of offenses deemed criminal: Now not only were
production, trade and conspiracy criminal, but knowing acquisition, possession, use, conversion or transfer of property derived the reform. 47 By
expanding the scope of the criminal and reducing the reach of the rehabilitative, the 1988 Convention shifted away from the administrative and
toward the prohibitive mode.48

The Convention retained the basic import-export scheme established by the 1925
41.
Convention, providing that each signatory would establish estimates of the amount of narcotics required to fulfill "medical and scientific" purposes. Id. art. 19, 520 U.N.T.S. at 252. The
Convention went on to provide a series of detailed instructions relating both to production,
possession and trade of narcotics to ensure that these limitations were upheld, in particular
establishing several categories of control relating to opium and coca.
Id. art. 36, para. 1(a), 520 U.N.T.S. at 252.
42.
"Intentional participation in, conspiracy to commit and attempts to commit" such
43.
offenses "if committed in different countries" were punishable offenses. Id. art. 36, para. 2,
520 U.N.T.S. at 252.
Id. art. 36, para. 1(b), 520 U.N.T.S. at 252.
44.
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,
45.
May 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 Convention]. The 1988 Convention
established the next multilateral instrument to deal frontally with narcotics. The 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances established similar controls over LSD and similar substances.
1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 21, 1971, T.I.A.S. No. 9725, 1019
U.N.T.S. 174.
1988 Convention, supra note 44, art. 3, para. 4(c) & (d), 1582 U.N.T.S. at 172-73.
46.
Id. art. 3, para. 1(b) & (c), 1582 U.N.T.S. at 172.
47.
The 1988 Convention does preserve the 1961 Convention's parameters for licit
48.
trade in narcotics by defining as an offense the production or trade of a narcotic or psychotropic substance "contrary to" the 1961 Convention's controls. Id. art. 3, para. 1, 1582 U.N.T.S.
at 172. While the administrative controls for licit trade in narcotics under the 1961 Convention
remained intact, the 1988 Convention substantially expanded the 1961 Convention's punitive
sanctions aimed at illicit trade.
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The latest U.N. agreement, the Convention on Transnational Organized Crime of 2000, expands the range of criminal offenses even further.
In addition to the offenses identified by the 1961 and 1988 Conventions,
the 2000 Convention adds anti-racketeering type provisions, criminalizing "participation in an organized criminal group" and "laundering of the
proceeds of crime." 9 The 2000 Convention also makes criminal both the
promise, offer, or gift of reward to, and the solicitation or acceptance of
reward by, a public official to facilitate criminal activity.5"
Comparing the development of the international trade regime to the
international narcotics regime reveals opposing trends. The regime governing general trade in goods has shifted from a protectionist regulatory
model, to an administrative model, and finally toward a liberalized
model. The regime governing trade in narcotics, however, has moved
from a liberalized model to an administrative model, to an expansively
prohibitionist model. The next Part offers an explanation of the conceptual dynamic that reconciles these trends.
IV. MEDIATING

THE TENSION

The GATT/WTO system operates on the foundational belief that liberalization of international trade in goods will maximize world welfare.
The international narcotics regime operates on the belief that prohibition
of trade in narcotic drugs will do the same. Why should liberalization of
one set of goods be desirable, but liberalization in another set of goods
be undesirable?
Like any species of market control, the criminalization of the international narcotics trade betrays the ambivalent impulses of "liberal
governance." On the one hand, the market provides a grand theater for
individual choice that is the sine qua non of prevailing liberal theory.5

49.

Convention on Transnational Organized Crime of 2000, G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N.

GAOR, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 105, Annex I, arts. 5, 6, at 5-7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25

(2000) [hereinafter 2000 Convention].
50.
Id. art. 7, at 7-8.
51.
Political theorists champion such pursuit as an essential component of individual
liberty. Economists assure that such pursuit also paves the best route to social welfare, since
individual market transactions allocate social resources in the most efficient way. Welfare
economics assumes "that the individual-and no one else-is the best judge of his own wellbeing." E.J. Mishan, A Survey of Welfare Economics, 80 ECON. J. 197 (1960). Welfare (W) =
W(UI, U2 ... , Un), where U 1, etc. represent the "utility indexes" of individual members of

society. An individual's "utility" is attained when that individual reaches the maximum level
of satisfaction available to her given her choices. Thus, each individual's utility is itself a function of that individual's preferences. Social welfare, by extension, is a function of the
preferences of all individuals in the society.
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On the other hand, governments maintain an infinite array of controls on
the choices available to individuals in the market.
The tension between principles of liberalism and practices of market
control emerges in both the trade regimes for legal goods and for illegal
narcotics. In the GATT/WTO system, the principles of free trade are offset by exceptions allowing for trade restrictions. In the international
narcotics regime, the backdrop of a liberalized international economic
order contrasts with the foreground of narcotics prohibitionism.
Such puzzles should not be dismissed as unrelated idiosyncrasies of
modern international governance. These conflicting regimes do relate to
each other in an underlying framework, in which the discrepancy between liberalization and prohibition is mediated through the concept of
normalcy in international trade: liberalization for "normal" international
trade; restriction and prohibition for "abnormal" international trade. The
normalcy concept organizes
the apparent contradiction along parallel
52
sides of a dichotomy.
A. Normalcy as a Basisfor Controlling
Licit InternationalTrade
Within the GATT/WTO system, the concept of normalcy rationalizes
exceptions for trade restrictions. 3 Normalcy in trade is emphatically
conceptual, rather than empirical. Member States, in imposing trade
restrictions, operate against a background assumption that the "usual,
normal condition is ... non-intervention" in the market; but their regular
and vigorous use of such provisions belies any portrayal of them as
exceptional measures, at least as measured by frequency of occurrence."
52.
The reconciliation does not resolve the conflict but sends it underground, where it
generates a subterranean turmoil that reform advocates-including advocates of drug legalization-are constantly attempting to unearth.
53.
Daniel K. Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of InternationalTrade, 100
HARv. L. REV. 546 (1987). The same analysis could be applied to the "social clause"
exception in the GATTJWTO system. Commentators have at times been at pains to establish,
for example, the reasons why the social clause exception seems to provide insufficient support
for WTO members to maintain environmental restrictions on international trade. Critics of the
WTO dispute settlement body's interpretation of the social clause have worried about the
narrow construction the WTO has adopted. The basic response to this worry is the rejoinder
that, in the WTO, principles must be construed broadly and exceptions narrowly in order to
maintain the integrity of the system. While this narrowness is worrisome even without
considering normalcy as a mediating concept, it takes on new dimensions when such a
consideration is addressed. If normalcy is a mediating concept, then the implication of the
status of the social clause as an exception to, rather than a central principle of, the trade
regime is that social regulation is itself somehow "abnormal." Such a view would almost
certainly result in increased pressures over time under WTO law to lower the levels of social
regulation of its Member States.
54.
Id. at 550. In particular, use of antidumping duty laws, pioneered by the U.S. goverment, is chronic and increasing. Id.
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Moreover, the assumption driving such measures is that "abnormal"
market conditions are afoot-goods have been sold at "less than normal
value," or have been imported at abnormally high levels 5-but the
criteria by which such findings are made find very little support among
economists."
The lack of empirical coherence suggests that governments employ
trade restrictions not to counteract objectively ascertainable market distortion, but rather to service policy goals that compete with market
liberalization, such as protecting domestic industries and workers from
dislocation caused by market competition.57
Too explicit a recognition of such activity, however, would undermine the ideological imperative that the market is always good, and
more competition is always better than less competition. The mediating
concept of normalcy steps in to buffer and obscure awareness of the limits of this imperative. Rather than market competition per se causing
dislocation and harm, trade law restrictions assert that the harm is caused
by an abnormal market. A submerged, but powerful, syllogism operates:
"Since the market is normally good, market constraints are not normally
justified. If the market is normally good, then a bad market is an abnormal market. If the market is abnormal, then market constraints are
justified."58 With this syllogism in place, governments are able to move
from a liberal model to an administrative model that discounts the norm
of liberalization, but in a constrained fashion that does not threaten the
entire framework.
B. Normalcy as a Basisfor Prohibiting
InternationalNarcoticsTransactions
While a tension exists between liberal market norms and trade restrictions in the licit international trade regime, the contrast between
55.
The former finding would support an imposition of antidumping duties, the latter
would support an imposition of safeguards. In each case, a finding of injury would also be
required.
56.
Antidumping duty laws have been criticized for, among other things, failing to have
a factually reliable means of determining "normal value," and failing to take into account key
indicators of dumping such as the prevailing market price for the good in question. Safeguard

laws have been criticized for using a variable time frame to determine what constitutes an
abnormally high import level, and also for failing to reliably distinguish the impact of imports
from other potential causes of injury to domestic industry. These decisions are made by administrative agencies with relatively high levels of discretion, using criteria that vary from
case to case. The instability of the frameworks has helped to create an impression that the
application of these laws is not reliably governed by empirical economic findings.

57.

Under the antidumping and safeguard rules, both producers and workers have

standing to petition the United States to impose protections.

58.
see

For one illuminating discussion of free market iedology, its benefits and its limits,

JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND

ITS

DISCONTENTS

(2002).
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liberal market norms and the international narcotics regime is more extreme. As Anthony Kronman has observed, "Whenever the law
invalidates a class of agreements . .

.,

it runs counter to the liberal ideal

of a legal order that does not discriminate among conceptions of the
good."59 After all, a hallmark principle of liberal, market society is that
individuals can pursue their own "conceptions of the good" as long as
they do not "violate the rights of others. 6 ° Prohibiting some goods would
seem to challenge the liberal belief in the sanctity of personal freedom
and the priority of choice. 6'
So why prohibition of narcotics? From the conclusion that market
controls are justified on the premise of abnormality, derived from the
syllogism described above, it follows that international narcotics trade is
viewed as abnormal trade-and trade so extremely abnormal that neartotal prohibition is warranted.
In what way(s) are narcotics "abnormal" goods? Not from an
economist's perspective: The economic definition of a "normal good" (a
good of which one tends to consume more as one's income increases,
assuming that one has a preference for it) applies no less to narcotics
(and in fact more to narcotics) than to other goods. The concept of normalcy here, then, does not describe the market dynamics related to
production and consumption of narcotics.
More likely, narcotics register as "abnormal" by virtue of their
harmful impact. If narcotics users regularly harm others-family and
community members, employers, co-workers-prohibition reduces this
abnormally harmful impact.62 Most studies, however, suggest that
See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalismand the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J.
59.
794-95 (1983).
See id.
60.
Take, for example, the definition of economically rational action, which is any ac61.
tion that furthers an individual's own preferences according to his or her own ranking. If left
unqualified, this definition means that anything an individual chooses to do is, by necessity,
rational: kill his parents, jump off a bridge, watch professional bowling on television, and so
on-including, of course, snorting cocaine or injecting heroine. This is not satisfying for purposes of justifying legal constraint.
Here we can introduce two concepts that bolster the basic justification for the lib62.
eral State: order and mistake. Order provides a justification for liberal governance because it

constrains individual freedom insofar as such constraint is necessary to preserve the conditions
for freedom over the long term. The possibility of mistake endows the liberal subject with the
potential, through exercise of free will, for triumph or failure. Mistake also means the correctness of one's actions is judged not according to one's own preferences, but rather according to
some external ranking. A ranking provided by religious doctrine might condemn drug use
because it defiles the human body, which is the product of divine creation. A ranking provided
by the economic principle of wealth maximization might condemn drug use because it increases waste of resources: the drug user may squander her assets in order to fuel her
addiction. (In economic terms, her demand for drugs would be absolutely inelastic downward,
and elastic only upward. This extreme inelasticity might prevent socially optimal tradeoffs.)
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narcotics consumption does not, by itself, cause violent behaviour.63
Longer-term public health or economic concerns about the welfare or
productivity of the individual may also justify prohibiting narcotics. Yet,
most substances whose ingestion may produce long-term harmful effects
are not prohibited. Production, trade, and consumption of many of these
substances is regulated and controlled, but not completely prohibited.
Prohibition is objectively justified only if the long-term destructive
effects of narcotics use substantially exceed those of other harmful, nonprohibited substances. 64
While medical and social science provides a partial explanation for
prohibitionism, one might also turn to history. In part, prohibition
resulted from a late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century
reform movement endorsing a moral, social, and religious condemnation
of indulgence. The professional health and science corps also began to
deplore "[h]abit-forming drugs and their ravages, destructive of both the
morals and the health of the community. '65 In the United States, this tone
grew increasingly alarmist in the early decades of the twentieth century.
In a 1913 article announcing "Drug Habit Grips the Nation," a New York
Times reporter recounted a speech made by Dr. B.C. Keister before a
meeting of "scientists and specialists" about narcotics use in the United
States, said to be "second only to China."' Dr. Keister reportedly
asserted that "the menace is so great ... there is danger of our
'degenerating back to something worse than monkeydom.'67
As this last account may begin to suggest, the high-toned invocations
of morals and health at times intermingled with coarser concerns about
"unassimilable" populations crowding native shores at the turn of the
twentieth century. 68 During the nineteenth century, the United States experienced a significant increase in Chinese immigration. At the same
time, reports of opium importation from China, often in evasion of the
United States's early and substantial tariffs on opium imports, occurred
63.
See supra text accompanying note 7.
64.
Alcohol, tobacco, and fast food provide ready examples. Some may argue that,
however harmful addictions to alcohol, tobacco, or fast food might prove, narcotics addictions
exceed these others in destructiveness by an order of magnitude. A comparison of the public
health and sociopharmacological effects of these and other addictive products is beyond the
scope of this Article.
65.
Edward Marshall, Great Legislative Plan to Stamp Out Cocaine Habit, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 1914, Magazine, at 8; see also Davis Edwards, Opium a GreaterMenace to New York
Than Liquor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1912, Magazine, § 5, at I.
66.
Special to the New York Times, Say Drug Habit Grips the Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.

5, 1913, at 8.
67.

Id.

68.
The concerns did limit themselves to narcotics. "Middle-class America deplored
the[] open acceptance of liquor" among newly populous "Roman Catholics and Jews from
Italy, Poland and Russia." DAVID J. LANGUM, CROSSING OVER THE LINE 16(1994).
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frequently. 69 The U.S. government's concern about opium mirrored that
of the Chinese government, and both governments led the way in shifting the posture of the international trade regime away from Britain's
market-expansion approach and toward prohibitionism. Nevertheless,
alarm over narcotics use often found expression in the same vein as
alarm over Chinese immigration. An 1878 article decried "[t]he constant
immigration of Chinese, together with the extent of the use of this noxious drug [opium] in the United States."7
The combination of anti-immigrant and anti-narcotics sentiment did
not only influence public commentary, it also manifested in foreign relations policies of the U.S. government. On the same day in 1880, for
example, the U.S. government signed anti-narcotics and antiimmigration treaties with the Chinese government. The first provided
that the United States could "regulate, limit or suspend" the "coming of
Chinese laborers to the United States" to protect the "interests" or "good
order" of the United States. The second prohibited "Chinese subjects"
from importing opium into the United States, as well as "citizens of the
United States" from importing opium into China.'
The categorization of narcotics as "abnormal" goods, then, appears
complex and multilayered. In part, prohibition of narcotics rests on contemporary health policy concerns. In part, prohibition is the legacy of a
complex set of social reform movements that peaked at the turn of the
twentieth century. The voices of reform often conflated moral and health
69.
See, e.g., A Heavy Opium Seizure, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 28, 1897, at I (noting that drugs
valuing $400,000 were "[i]mported by Chinamen"); Four Chinamen Captured, N.Y. TIMES,
May 4, 1897, at 3 (noting that the captured men "had secreted [opium] in the lining of their
clothing"); Two Thousand Pounds of Opium Seized, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1882, at 3.
70.
The Opium Traffic, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 18, 1878, at 6. The interaction between antinarcotics and anti-immigration sentiment came on full display in an 1885 New York Times
column. The author, writing from Portland, reported: "Ever since Chinese began to come to
the Pacific coast there has been more or less ill feeling towards them ....The appearance,
habits, customs and non-assimilating character of the race were objected to." The Chinese
Question, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1885, at 3. The combined expression of economic and social
alarm continued:
In both [San Francisco and Portland], the Chinese had established their shops,
opium dens, and gambling houses in the very heart of the business portion of the
city, and by reason of their having obtained long leases of the buildings it was impossible to drive them to any other quarter. The race was non-assimilating, had no
desire to become American citizens or to even learn the language. Its sole desire
was to make money out of Americans and return with it to China.
Id. The tone crescendoed to a panicky excoriation of the Chinese as a threat to public health,
leaning heavily on the opium threat: "[Tihey live in the foulest kind of atmospheres in underground holes and in filthy places with the sickening fumes of opium forever prevalent." Id.
71.
See The Treaties with China, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1881, at I (both treaties were
signed at Peking on November 17, 1880). For a treatment of this phenomenon in Australia, see
generally DESMOND MANDERSON, FROM MR. SIN TO MR. BIG (1993).
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concerns. Some voices further conflated such concerns about immigra-

tion of a distinctly xenophobic cast.
Within this latter discourse, narcotics posed one of many threats to
the "social body." This threat was bound up with an interlocking set of

threats posed by immigration, urbanization, and industrialization. Within
this discourse it was possible to urge the expulsion of foreign elements
from the social body through the language of prohibitionism. The category of the abnormal mediated the oppositional relationship between this

strong prohibitionist impulse and the emerging embrace of market liberalization."
V. THE

INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

A. The GATT/WTO Regime
Whereas the general international trade regime and the international
narcotics regime moved in opposite directions in their substantive strategies, on the institutional level they each moved in parallel directions

toward greater harmonization and authoritativeness of enforcement.
According to the accepted view, for much of the postwar era the
GATT deliberately set low expectations for compliance, overlooking
blatant departures from GATT discipline.73 This pragmatic approach
was part of a self-consciously sophisticated and "cosmopolitan"

72.
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the prohibitionist position
found its strongest support in the United States and Chinese governments. The Chinese government opposed the narcotics trade in part as an anti-imperial move resisting British
economic domination. As a nascent world power, the United States gestured toward China to
build an alliance against this seemingly corrupt aspect of the British Empire. The American
view toward China was complex in a way that cannot be captured in this brief treatment, and
involved, among other things, domestic tension between the West Coast where most Chinese
immigration occurred, and the East Coast which seemed to hold a more ambiguous cultural
fascination with the "Celestial Empire" and foreign affairs strategy, which involved the
American attempt to stake out a position as a leader in the international community. In the
early phase of the narcotics regime, the U.S. and China positions were buffered by the more
liberal views of the United Kingdom and Europe. In the early agreements, science mediated
between licit and illicit consumption. The gradual rise to preeminence of the prohibitionist
position over the mid-twentieth century can be attributed to several factors, including: the
continued ascendance of the United States as a world power, the increased association of narcotics with organized crime, and the rise of the countercultural threat to middle-class society.
73.
See, e.g., Detlev Vagts & John H. Jackson, Book Review, Law And Its Limitations
In The GATT Multilateral Trade System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 653, 653-54 (1988) ("[T]he
GATT has had to exist without the many institutional clauses found in normal organization
charters. These deficiencies are noted by the author, who describes many of the fascinating
circumstances of practice and evolution that have allowed the GATT to exist as a pragmatic
and reasonably effective legal order.")
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approach to international law and policy. 4 With the establishment of
the GATT's successor organization, the World Trade Organization, the
international trade regime moved decisively toward legalism as an
institutional model.75 The crowning glory of the WTO was its dispute
settlement system, which remains the strongest multilateral forum by a
considerable measure. 6

74.

See David Kennedy, The InternationalStyle in Post-War Law & Policy, 1994

UTAH

L. REV. 7 (1994). This narrative may have emerged partially in hindsight and may therefore
seem over-determined. There is significant truth, however, to the notion that "pragmatic" institutional values were explicitly in circulation in the GATT at the time. For instance, Olivier
Long, who headed the GATT in the 1970s, wrote a testimonial to this concept entitled Law
and Its Limitations in the GATT See OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT
MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 94-98 (1985) (highlighting, from Long's position as DirectorGeneral of the GATT from 1968 to 1980, the practical enforcement techniques of the GATT).

The shortfalls in compliance during this era were numerous. Industrialized countries, for their
part, engaged in substantial departure from GATT disciplines on textiles and agriculture. See
id. at 56. If developing countries had a less glaring problem with formal compliance, it was
because they argued that the principle of "special and differential treatment" should except
them from many GATT rules. See ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GAIT
LEGAL SYSTEM 30 (1987) (describing developing-country compliance as a situation of form
without substance). It should be noted, however, that the principle of special and differential
treatment enjoys a solid basis in international law, both in form and substance. See Thomas,
supra note 23, at 1259-60 (describing the emergence of the principle and its operation in the
GATT). Whereas public international institutions explicitly aspired toward universal and universally obeyed standards the GATT was content with compliance that reflected the will of the
States.
75.
The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, which led to the establishment in 1995
of the WTO, marked a decisive break with the pragmatic strategy of the past. Kenneth W.
Abbott, The Many Faces of International Legalization, 92 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 57
(1998); Miquel Montafia i Mora, A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins Over Politics in the Resolution
of International Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103 (1993); G. Richard Shell,
Trade Legalism and InternationalRelations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organiza-

tion, 1995 DUKE L.J. 830, 833 ("[T]he new WTO system represents a stunning victory for
international trade 'legalists' in their running debate with trade 'pragmatists'.... ); Thomas,
supra note 23, at 1250 ("[linstitutionally, the order has moved away from 'pragmatism' and
towards 'legalism.' ")
76.
SYLVIA OSTRY, REINFORCING THE WTO 20 (1998) (describing the dispute settlement mechanism as "the 'jewel in the crown' of the WTO"). The WTO dispute settlement
mechanism featured the following novel reinforcements: (1) it established a dispute resolution
timeline of approximately fifteen months (whereas disputes in the GATT were not subject to
any timeline, and the longest one ran for over a decade); (2) it created an appellate review
body (no such body existed in the GATT); (3) it made adoption of findings virtually automatic
(findings can be rejected only by unanimous decision-by contrast, GATT findings were infrequently adopted because unanimous consent was required for their adoption rather than
their rejection); (4) it increased the ease and likelihood of concrete sanction for noncompliance through the authorization of retaliation by the adversely affected party (such retaliation had occurred only once in the decades-long operation of the GATT dispute resolution
mechanism). For a general discussion of the WTO dispute settlement system and comparison
with the GATT, see LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, supra note
21, at 327-7 1.
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B. The InternationalNarcoticsRegime

Progression toward a formal and uniform structure for enforcement
also characterizes the international narcotics regime." Again, this
progression has occurred incrementally. The 1961 Convention said
relatively little about the institutional mechanics of punishing illicit
trade,"8 but it did establish basic standards for extradition of
offenders.7 9 The 1988 Convention went further, requiring a Member State
that refused extradition to pursue internal prosecution." The 2000
Convention expanded the bases for extradition to include not only those
acts defined as offenses under the treaty, but also any other act involving
an "organized criminal group" that constituted an offense in both
countries."
The 1988 and 2000 Conventions developed additional mechanisms
to increase efficacy in criminal enforcement. Both conventions

77.
Both multilateral regimes bear the distinct imprimatur of the United States, which is
not surprising given its position as the sole superpower. The enhanced multilateral dispute
settlement of the WTO was a project of the United States. The enhanced mechanisms for enforcing narcotics prohibition multilaterally also stem largely from the United States. Even the
most idealistic internationalist acknowledges that international legal mechanisms rest on the
will of States, and the will of States is the result not only of domestic political decisions but
also of international pressures. The landscape of international law in our age then reflects both
the substantive and institutional preferences of the current hegemon. Substantively, there is a
general preference for liberalizing trade, curtailed sharply by strong prohibitions of selected
forms of trade. Institutionally, there is a strong preference for judicialized resolution of disputes over licit trade-a sort of intergovernmental civil litigation-and a preference for a very
strong punitive treatment of illicit trade. We can identify these dynamics without necessarily
casting a value judgment-unless it is from the perspective of a more balanced distribution of
power in the initial decisions as to substantive and institutional framework. We can also expect, consequently, that if and when the balance of power shifts, the substantive and
institutional dynamics of the world order will shift accordingly. There is much talk, for example, of the twenty-first century as an era that will witness the ascendance of Asia, and in
particular of China, in international relations. At the moment, however, I want to set aside the
origins of the current multilateralism, and to examine its general implications for international
order.
78.
In the administrative phase reflected in the 1961 Convention, there were instructions on how the administration of licit trade in narcotics should occur. The 1961 Convention
required, for example, that a signatory establish a centralized "national opium agency" that
would closely control both cultivation and trading of opium. 1961 Convention, supra note 40,
art. 23, para. 2(a)-(e), 520 U.N.T.S. at 234.
79.
Id. art. 36, para. 2(b), 520 U.N.T.S. at 252. The 1961 Convention provided that
offenses as defined under the treaty were extraditable. As described above, these included both
illicit production and trade, and "[i]ntentional participation in, conspiracy to commit and attempts to commit" such activities. Id. art. 36, para.l(a), 2(a)(ii), 520 U.N.T.S. at 252.
Signatories could, if they made extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty, use the
provisions of the Convention for that purpose. Id. art. 36, para. 2(b), 520 U.N.T.S. at 252.
80.
1988 Convention, supra note 45, art. 6, para. 9, 1582 U.N.T.S. at 181.
81.
2000 Convention, supra note 49, art. 16, para. 1,at 13.
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progressively expanded subject matter jurisdiction.82 They also
multiplied the bases for confiscation of narcotics materials and
instruments." Each convention also contributed unique techniques to the
enforcement arsenal. The 1988 Convention allowed for and encouraged
eradication of illicit crops.84 The 2000 Convention allows Member States
to use "special investigative techniques, such as electronic or other forms
of surveillance and undercover operations" to aid enforcement. 85 The
2000 Convention also requires members to "institute a comprehensive
domestic regulatory and supervisory regime for banks and non-bank
financial institutions ... in order to deter and detect all forms of money
laundering."86
Finally, by the 2000 Convention, the regime had achieved a remarkably high level of coordination of the international punishment of
the narcotics trade, not only in the "horizontal" sense that uniform
mechanisms for enforcement had been established, but also in the "vertical" sense that those mechanisms enable greater extension of the
punitive arm of the State than envisioned under any previous multilateral
arrangement. The next and final Part discusses the implications of this
development for international law.

82.
Thus, the 1988 Convention required a signatory to establish jurisdiction over defined offenses when such offenses were committed in the signatory's territory or in vessels
bearing its flag or registered under its laws. 1988 Convention, supra note 45, art. 4, para. 1(a),
1582 U.N.T.S. at 174. It also allowed signatories to establish additional jurisdiction to cover
offenses committed by its nationals or residents, or outside its territory "with a view to the
commission, within its territory:' of a defined offense. Id. art. 4, para. 1(b), 1582 U.N.T.S. at
175. The Convention also allows a member to establish jurisdiction when "the offence is
committed on board a vessel concerning which that Party has been authorized to take appropriate action... ' Id. The 2000 Convention adds to these options for jurisdictional expansion
the right of a Member State to include offenses committed against a national of that State.
2000 Convention, supra note 49, art. 15, para. 2(a), at 12.
83.
The 1988 Convention required its members to adopt measures enabling the confiscation of narcotics or materials and instruments used in their production, as well as of
proceeds derived from their illicit production or trade. Id. art. 5, para. 1, 1582 U.N.T.S. at 176.
The 2000 Convention adds to this a requirement for international cooperation for purposes of
confiscation. A Member State that has received a request from another Member State having
jurisdiction over a defined offense (under the expanded substantive scope of the 2000 Convention, including not only production or trade of narcotics, but also conspiracy or attempt
thereto, as well as money laundering, corruption, or obstruction of justice) for confiscation of
proceeds within its territory "shall, to the greatest extent possible within its domestic legal
system ... give effect" to such a request. 2000 Convention, supra note 49, art. 13, para. 1(a),
at 10. A Member State also "shall take measures to identify, trace and freeze or seize proceeds
of crime, property or other instrumentalities" related to defined offenses, at the request of
another Member State. Id.
84.
1988 Convention, supra note 45, art. 14, 1582 U.N.T.S. at 194-95.
85.
2000 Convention, supra note 49, art. 20, at 20-21.
86.
Id. art. 7, at 7-8.

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 24:549

VI. THE "MICRO-PHYSICS" OF POWER AND THE
INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL BODY

Few theorists of the State have looked to the punitive arm of the
State as constitutive of the State's authority. Rather, contractarian and
civic republican theorists view the punishment of individuals as a consequence of State authority. Such theorists see the ability to punish is an
indispensable attribute of sovereignty; but that sovereignty has already
been established through a "social contract" between the State and its
citizen/subject, or as a result of shared civic mores. It is possible, however, to conceptualize punishment as performing a formative role for the
State. Rather than punishment flowing from power, power may flow
from punishment.
In his relatively brief survey of criminal punishment under monarchic and republican French governments, Michel Foucault attempted to
show how the act of exercising direct, ultimate dominion over individual
bodies through the administration of punitive sentences secured the
State's authority in a way not possible through any other means. Foucault began by suggesting that, in the pre-modern, monarchic era, public
spectacles of punishment-hangings and more gruesome forms of execution-generated power by publicly displaying the State's ultimate
control over individual life and death.87
By juxtaposing the modern penal State with this pre-modern style of
punishment, Foucault showed how the power-generating function of
punishment in fact continued in the modern era. The transition featured
the transformation of punishment from the occasional spectacle to less
violent but more sustained controls on the criminal population, through
imprisonment. The legal and administrative functions of the modern
State combined to form a bureaucracy of punishment.8 The modem
State revamped the technologies of punishment into fine-grained and
constant monitoring and control oyer criminals, establishing a "microphysics" of power.89
87.
88.

See FOUCAULT, supra note 1.
Foucault wrote:

Throughout the eighteenth century, inside and outside the legal apparatus, in both
everyday penal practice and the criticism of institutions, one sees the emergence of
a new strategy for the exercise of the power to punish ... : to make of the punishment and repression of illegalities a regular function, coextensive with society; not
to punish less, but to punish better; to punish with an attenuated severity perhaps,
but in order to punish with more universality and necessity; to insert the power to
punish more deeply into the social body.
Id. at 81-82.
89.
Id. at 139.
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The idea that the modem State controls individual activity through
punishment is by no means unique. To the contrary, as described above,
an important justification for the liberal State is precisely that it constrains individuals where such constraints are in the "public interest."'
The Foucauldian insight is limited, therefore, to the thesis on the constitutive role of punishment. According to this thesis, the expansion of the
apparatus of punishment not only results from, but is also critical to
building, legitimacy for the State.
Can this insight be transferred to the international order? International legal theorists have devoted considerable energy to determining
the bases for building efficacy and authoritativeness in the international
legal order. For much of the post-World War II era, many theorists assumed that such efficacy would come from the central organs of the
United Nations. In the past decade, however, new twists in international
legal development have suggested that other sites in the international
legal landscape may ultimately be more productive in generating authoritativeness. For example, the international trade regime has become
surprisingly authoritative, causing theorists to accord it new recognition
as a critical part of public international law.9'
Just as the expansion of the international trade regime has proved an
important source of authority for the international legal order, the reinforcement and expansion of agreements for controlling illegal
international markets may prove to offer a surprising source of energy and
ballast for this order.
Particularly because these agreements are designed to effectuate the
punishment of individuals, they seem to command an authoritativeness
more direct and more pervasive than that found in other multilateral regimes. This development can be related to the effort to construct an
International Criminal Court (ICC), which also seems to signal a new era
of international authoritativeness. The ICC seeks to target State practices, but will do so through the punishment of individuals in a
centralized forum. In contrast, the U.N. conventions on narcotics trade
retain a decentralized mechanism for punishment, allowing States to
pursue punishment internally or bilaterally, but seek control over individuals qua individuals.
The unique qualities of this regime can be placed alongside other
contemporary developments in international law to show how the international legal order is exercising increasingly direct authority over the
90.
Indeed, the entire pantheon of modern State theory justifies constraining, through
criminal or civil measures, constitutional or otherwise, individual action to secure the public
interest.
91.
See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, supra note 75, at 57; Kenneth W. Abbott, GA7Tas a
Public Institution: The Uruguay Round and Beyond, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 31 (1992).
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individual. Human rights law, of course, paves the way by seeking to
protect individuals and in some cases offer them direct access to international tribunals. The ICC will punish individuals in an international
tribunal, for actions committed on behalf of States. The narcotics regime
does not provide an international tribunal, but establishes a multilateral
basis for the uniform punishment of "private" individuals. 92 As such, the
development of an international criminal law for the enforcement of narcotics prohibition provides a distinctive site for international legal
authority.
As this discussion shows, the international legal order does not operate through a monolithic world government. The piecemeal adaptation of
public functions to the international level challenges a traditional view
that international law will progress toward a centralized, coordinated
transfer of social regulation to the international order. Instead, currently
there are particular versions and types of the public, rather than one universalized regime.
It is the sheer expanse of envisioned control that makes the international narcotics regime so interesting from this point of view. Consider
Foucault again:
The true objective of the reform movement, even in its most
general formulations, was not so much to establish a new right
to punish based on more suitable principles, as to set up a new
"economy" of the power to punish, to assure its better distribution, so that it should be neither too concentrated at certain
privileged points, nor too divided between opposing authorities;
so that it should be distributed in homogenous circuits capable
of operating everywhere, in a continuous way, down to the finest
grain of the social body.93
The United Nations conventions on narcotics have extended and refined these international mechanisms of distributing punishment. As the
narcotics trade has become globalized, more "widely spread," the Conventions have "[d]efine[d] new tactics."94 Punishment and the effects of
punishment have indeed been adapted through these "new techniques" 95
The "art of punishing" has indeed, through these conventions, been
92.
The ICC tracks the traditional division of power at the international level because
its focus is on State behavior. In a sense, the ICC involves the agreement of Member States to
set up a system for judging their actions, as States, against recognized human rights principles.
As such, the ICC does not transcend the traditional contours of law at the international level-

those contours reflecting the sovereign States-but reinforces them.
93.
FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 80.
94.
95.

See supra note I and accompanying text.
Id.
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"regulariz[ed], refin[ed], universaliz[ed] " 96 The "circuits" of enforcement have duly been "multipl[ied]."97 In short, then, these conventions
have succeeded in "constitute [ing] a new economy and a new technology
of the power to punish."98
Such legal development suggests that a new "social body" may be
forming at the international level as a result of this spread of control. In
that sense, the multilateral narcotics regime-as one aspect of the regulation of markets-is an important, if oft overlooked, part of the public
international order.

96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.

